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Comment
LEGAL TESTS TO DETERMINE THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
STATUTES RESTRICTING FIRST AMENDMENT FREEDOMS
INTRODUCTION
Prior to 1919, only a few important cases involving first amendment freedoms
had been considered by the United States Supreme Court. However, in 1917
Congress passed two laws, which resulted in extensive litigation concerning freedom
of speech during wartime, and from that time to the present the Court has taken
an active -part in the protection of first amendment freedoms.
When presented with a question of whether a freedom secured by the first
amendment has been infringed upon, two dilemmas immediately appear. First,
there is the dilemma stated by Abraham Lincoln: "Whether any government,
not too strong for the liberties of its people, can be strong enough to maintain
its existence in great emergencies."2 And second, the dilemma arises which may
appear in any field of law-the desire for certainty in legal principles on the
one hand, and the desire for justice on the other.3 The ultimate problem is one
of weighing two interests: "the relative necessity of the public interest as
against private rights." 4 In solving this problem the Supreme Court has formu-
lated many different tests and doctrines during different periods of time, the
evolution of which might be better described as a single process rather than a
set of inexorable rules. It is the purpose of this comment to examine briefly
some of the legal tests which have been, and are being, employed by the Court
in reaching, insofar as possible, a satisfactory solution to the two dilemmas with
which it is faced.5
1. Conscription Act of 1917, ch. 15, 40 Stat. 76; Espionage Act of 1917, ch.
29, § 4, 40 Stat. 217.
2. Response to a serenade, Nov. 10, 1864.
3. Goldberg, Current Limitations on Governmental Invasion of First Amend-
ment Freedoms, 13 OHIo ST. L.J. 237 (1952).
4. Barsky v. United States, 167 F.2d 241, 249 (D.C. Cir. 1948), cert. denied,
334 U.S. 843 (1948).
5. The cases discussed herein are in the main those which are considered lead-
ing in the field. The authorities which are cited are by no means exhaustive of the
supply of materials which has been written on the subject. For other writings of
interest see, Anderson, Constitutional Law-Freedom of Speech-Review of State
Court Decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court, 29 B.U.L. Rnv. 556 (1949); Antieau,
The Rule of Clear and Present Danger: Scope of Its Applicability, 48 MIcH. L.
REV. 811 (1950); Antieau, The Rule of Clear and Present Danger--Its Origin and
Application, 13 U. DET. L.J. 198 (1950); Antieau, Judicial Delimitation of the
First Amendment Freedoms, 34 MQ. L. Ray. 57 (1950); Antieau, Dennis v.
United States-Precedent, Principle or Perversion?, 5 VAin. L. REv. 141 (1952);
(471)
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I. FREE SPEEcH BEFORE 1940
A. The Clear and Present Danger Doctrine
The first test employed by the Court in this judicial process to determine
the constitutionality of statutes which, in one way or another, place restrictions
on first amendment freedoms, was formulated by Mr. Justice Holmes in the now
famous case of Schenck v. United States. As a result of the declaration of war
against Germany in 1917 and the passage by Congress of the Conscription Act,
Schenck and his fellow Socialist workers mailed anti-conscription circulars to
draftees charging that conscription was despotism in its worst form and a monstrous
wrong against humanity. The circular urged that the- conscripts assert their
opposition to the draft. Schenck and a fellow worker were indicted and convicted
for conspiracy to violate the Espionage Act of 1917 in that they attempted to
cause insubordination in the armed forces and to obstruct recruiting. On review
to the Supreme Court, Schenck claimed that the utterances in the circular were
protected by the freedom of speech provision of the first amendment.
Mr. Justice Holmes, speaking for a unanimous Court, seemed to assume
the constitutionality of the Espionage Act. For him the problem was whether it
could be applied to abridge speech and, if so, to delineate the constitutional limits
of such abridgment.7 In seeking to answer these questions he said:
We admit that in many places and in ordinary times the defendants in
saying all that was said in the circular would have -been within their con-
stitutional rights. But the character of every act depends upon the cir-
cumstances in which it is done .... The most stringent protection of free
speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and
causing a panic. It does not even protect a man from an injunction
against uttering words that may have all the effect of force. The question
in every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and
are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will
bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent.
It is a question of proximity and degree .... 8 (Emphasis added.)
Thus was born the "clear and present danger" test. Mr. Justice Holmes ,pointed
out that a hindrance to the war effort as was urged in the circular could not be
protected by any constitutional right, and that it was the intent of the action
and not success alone which warranted this conclusion and supported a criminal
conviction therefor.
Fellman, Recent Tendencies in Civil Liberties Decisions of the Supreme Court, 34
CORNELL L.Q. 331 (1949); Hyman, Judicial Standards for the Protection of Basic
Freedoms, 1 BUFFALO L. REV. 221 (1952); Marshall, Mr. Justice Murphy and Civil
Rights, 48 MicH. L. REv. 745 (1950); Meiklejohn, The First Amendment and Evils
that Congress has a Right to Prevent, 26 IND. L.J. 477 (1951); Steamer, Mr. Justice
Jackson and the First Amendment, 15 U. Prrr. L. REV. 193 (1954).
6. 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
7. Lusk, The Present Status of the "Clear and Present Danger Test"-A
Brief History and Some Observations, 45 Ky. L.J. 576, 577 (1957).
8. Schenck v. United States, supra note 6, at 52.
[Vol. 26
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Just what the ramifications of the test were and whether it would ever again
be used was not readily apparent. However, it was not employed in the next two
cases which involved claims of 'privileged speech, Frokwerk v. United States9 and
Debs v. United States.'0 Furthermore, neither case left even an impression of the
existence of a constitutional requirement that a "clear and present danger" of
some substantive evil be shown where intent to incite crime was found." Both
cases involved convictions under the Espionage Act, both decisions were unanimous,
both opinions were written by Mr. Justice Holmes, and in both the claims of
privileged speech under the first amendment were rejected and the clear and
present danger test unmentioned. The Schenck case was cited, but only in affirmance
of the principle that freedom of speech is not absolute.
The following year, however, the clear and present danger language re-
appeared in Mr. Justice Holmes' dissent in Abrams v. United States. 2 Mr. Justice
Holmes objected to the majority's upholding a conviction for violation of the
Espionage Act. He felt that the United States could constitutionally punish only
that speech which "produces or is intended to produce a clear and imminent
danger that it will bring about forthwith certain substantive evils" that the
Government may constitutionally prevent' 3
Mr. Justice Holmes retired from the Court in 1932, twelve years after the
Abrams case, but before that time he succeeded in enrolling another Justice under
his clear and present danger banner. That was Mr. Justice Brandeis who made his
initial contribution in this area in 1920, dissenting in Schaefer v. United States. 4
The Schaefer case pointed up the cleavage within the Court on the constitutional
question of how related to consequences speech had to be before it could be
punished. The majority held that the "tendency of articles and their efficacy were
enough for offense."'15 Mr. Justice Brandeis, however, insisted that the test to be
applied, "as in the case of criminal attempts and incitements-is not the remote
or possible effect. There must be the clear and present danger." .a
9. 249 U.S. 204 (1919). In this case the defendant had published twelve
newspaper articles criticizing this country's entry into the war and the conscription
of men for overseas duty.
10. 249 U.S. 211 (1919). Debs was convicted for delivering a speech in which
he spoke of the merits of socialism, denounced war as the curse of capitalism, and
praised certain persons who had been convicted of obstructing the draft.
11. Corwin, Bowing Out "Clear and Present Danger," 27 NOTRE DAmuE LAW.,
325, 329 (1952).
12. 250 U.S. 616 (1919). Russian-born Abrams and some of his comrades had
printed leaflets which were thrown from a window of a New York City 'building.
The leaflets called President Wilson a coward for sending United States troops "to
crush the Russian Revolution," and urged "workers of the world" to stop producing
munitions which were being used to murder those fighting for freedom in Russia.
13. Id. at 627.
14. 251 U.S. 466 (1920). Here, the majority affirmed a conviction under the
Espionage Act for the publication and dissemination of a German-language news-
paper which purportedly carried false reports on the progress of the war.
15. Id. at 479.
16. Id. at 486 (dissenting opinion).
1961]
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Pierce v. United States,'7 following shortly after Schaefer, found the Court
divided as before. The majority was willing to sustain a conviction under the
Espionage Act of Socialists who distributed a pamphlet telling of the gore of
war. Mr. Justice Pitney, for the majority, felt that freedom of the press could
be restricted if the statements "had a natural tendency to produce the forbidden
consequences,"18 but Justices Holmes and Brandeis again insisted that clear and
present danger should be the test.
The question then arises as to how the decisions in Abrams, Schaefer, and
Pierce can be reconciled inasmuch as both the majority and the dissenters placed
reliance on the Schenck decision. One explanation which has been offered is that
the "clear and present danger" language of the Schenck case was dictum:
That in reality it [the clear and present danger test] was not there
[Schenck v. United States] relied on, nor in the next two cases [Abrams
and Schaefer] is evident from the opinions of Holmes in the three cases.
They do not discuss in detail the circumstances in which the prohibited
words were uttered, nor whether the words under those circumstances
created a substantial and immediate probability of the evil to be pre-
vented. The . . .war . . . seems to have satisfied the test of "proximity
and degree." These decisions were handed down shortly after the .. .
Armistice [which] may have produced a reexamination of their position
by Holmes and Brandeis, and a determination that an inquiry into the
special facts of each case should henceforth be had to show whether the
deprivation of freedom of speech was so vitally necessary . . . .The ma-
jority . . . continued to make the . . . war . . . the basis for the applica-
tion of the restrictive statute. . .
B. The Bad Tendency Test
Mr. Justice Holmes' last word on the clear and present danger doctrine came
in his dissenting opinion in Gitlow v. New York.20 The Left Wing of the Socialist
17. 252 U.S. 239 (1920).
18. Id. at 244.
19. 'Lyon, The Clear and Present Danger Doctrine, 1 HASTfINGS L.J. 50, 53
(1949).
20. 268 U.S. 652 (1925). The case is important for the fact that it was the
first dealing with a peace-time -prosecution for criminal anarchy, but possibly over-
shadowing this factor, it was also the first case in which the Court held that the
restrictions imposed by the first amendment upon the federal government in the
areas of free speech and press were likewise imposed upon the states by virtue of
the fourteenth amendment. This was done by virture of an "assumption." Gitlow v.
New York, supra at 666. Similarly, De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937), de-
termined that the right of peaceable assembly was a right cognate to those of free
speech and free press and thus, too, was protected from state abridgment -by the
fourteenth amendment. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940), brought the
first amendment's protection of the free exercise of religion within the fourteenth
amendment so as to deprive states of the power to act in such a manner as would
place restrictions on this right. The Court also recognized that the right to the free
exercise of religion was not an absolute one. Everson v. Board of Educ. of the Town-
ship of Ewing, 330 U.S. 1 (1947), held further that states were prohibited by the
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Party printed in the Revolutionary Age, official organ of the party, the "Left
Wing Manifesto" which advocated destruction of the parliamentary state, exhorted
strikes, and ended with a prophecy of a revolutionary struggle against capitalism.
Gitlow, business manager of the Revolutionary Age, was convicted under a New
York statute punishing any advocacy of criminal anarchy, which was defined as
the doctrine that government should be overthrown by force or violence or any
unlawful means.
Delivering a seven-member opinion, Mr. Justice Sanford emphasized that the
State, under its police power, could punish utterances tending to corrupt public
morals, incite to crime, or disturb the peace. For the majority it was enough that
"its natural tendency and probable effect was to bring about the substantive evil
which the legislative body might prevent."21 Mr. Justice Sanford felt that the
State should be permitted to suppress the threatened danger in its incipiency and
therein he illustrated the basic difference in proximity and degree between the
bad tendency and clear and present danger standards. He distinguished the lan-
guage of Schenck by claiming that the general statement of the clear and present
danger was intended to apply only to statutes prohibiting acts and not, as in the
case under consideration, to statutes wherein the legislature had already found
a danger of substantive evil from utterances of a particular character.22 To repudi-
ate completely the clear and present danger test at this time would have been
difficult due to the considerable amount of publicity and approval it had received.
To accept the doctrine would- have meant freedom for Gitlow since the manifesto
did not present a clear and present danger to anything. Apparently the Court
wanted the conviction to stick. Since the majority felt it could not ignore the
doctrine, and to repudiate it meant an overruling of the unanimous Schenck
decision, it pursued the only available alternative: Gitlow and Schenck were "dis-
tinguished" and, as a result, the clear and present danger test was practically dis-
tinguished out of existence.23
The Schenck opinion declared that where a statute made certain acts or
conduct criminal, and a person was prosecuted on the theory that his speeches
or publications amounted to such acts, the question to be decided was whether
what had been said or publicized created a clear and present danger of bringing
them about. There was no statute prohibiting the publication of the circulars
which Schenck mailed; he had been indicted for violating a statute which forbade
obstruction of the draft and his conviction was sustained because the circular
created a clear and present danger that the draft would be obstructed. The statute
in Gitlow was different. It forbade certain "language" deemed by the legislature
to be dangerous. The statute was constitutional and:
[When] the legislative body has determined generally, in the constitutional
exercise of its discretion, that utterances of a certain kind involve such
danger of substantive evil that they may be punished, the question whether
21. Gitlow v. New York, supra note 20, at 671.
22. Id. at 668.
23. Lusk, supra note 7, at 598.
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any specific utterance coming within the prohibited class is likely, in
and of itself, to -bring about the substantive evil, is not open to considera-
tion. It is sufficient that the statute itself is constitutional and that the
use of the language comes within its prohibition.2 '
Having no intention to limit their test to the Espionage Act or to other
statutes prohibiting only activity, Justices Holmes and Brandeis dissented, insist-
ing on the application of the clear and present danger test. They felt that the
speaker should not be punished because evil results might occur at some in-
definite time in the future. Nevertheless, the majority applied what is known as
the "bad tendency" test. The test seemed to favor legislative action, for it would
appear that the distinction the majority made would give legislatures a green
light to suppress ideas merely by forbidding their expression.
In 1927, while the bad tendency test was being used by the majority, the case
of Whitney v. CalifornWia 5 presented itself to the Court. For purposes here, the
importance of Whitney lies in Mr. Justice Brandeis' concurrence which, at the
time, was potentially more significant than any opinion theretofore written on
matters of free speech. He argued that:
The fact that speech is likely to result in some violence or destruction of
property is not enough to justify its suppression. There must be the
probability of serious injury to the State....
Moreover, even imminent danger cannot justify resort to prohibition
of these functions essential to effective democracy, unless the evil appre-
hended is relatively serious. Prohibition of free speech and assembly is a
measure so stringent that it would be inappropriate as the means for
averting a relatively trivial harm to society.26
At another point Mr. Justice Brandeis asserted why he felt that Congress could
not guard against dangers of the future but must wait until danger is imminent:
To courageous, self-reliant men, with confidence in the power of free and
fearless reasoning applied through the processes of popular government,
no danger flowing from speech can be deemed clear and present, unless
the incidence of the evil apprehended is so imminent that it may befall
before there is opportunity for full discussion. If there be time to expose
through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the
processes of education, the remedy to be applied is more speech, not
enforced silence. 27
The persuasiveness of Mr. Justice Brandeis' arguments likely played no small
part in both the reappearance of the clear and present danger doctrine and the later
24. Gitlow v. New York, supra note 20, at 670.
25. 274 U.S. 357 (1927). Anita Whitney had been found guilty of violating
the California Criminal Syndicalism Act by willfully assisting in organizing and be-
coming a member of the group organized to advocate, teach or aid and abet crim-
inal syndicalism. She insisted that the conviction was invalid since there was no
intent to join for the forbidden purpose. The Court, in a unanimous decision, held
that this was a question of fact and not open to review.
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development of the preferred position doctrine. However, these effects were to
come later, for following Whitney there was no further mention of clear and present
danger for a full decade.28
C. Reappearance of the Clear and Present Danger Doctrine
The "clear and present danger" formula was resurrected in the 1937 case of
Herndon v. Lowry29 and, for the first time since Sckenck, in a majority opinion.
If the doctrine was ever to become a test of constitutionality, its limits and
operation could not be discerned until a conviction was actually held unconstitu-
tional by the Court by virtue of its application. This occurred in Lowry. A five-
man majority reversed a conviction under the Georgia Anti-Insurrection Statute
which penalized any attempt, by persuasion or otherwise, to induce others to join
in any combined resistance to the lawful authority of the State. The defendant
had solicited memberships for the Communist Party.
Mr. Justice Roberts applied the Schenck test as Justices Holmes and Brandeis
would apply it, asserting that there was not such a proximity between an in-
surrection and procurement of party members that the procurement could be
punished.
While the case is important for its application of the clear and present danger
test, it is significant also in that the Court stated that: "the power of a state to
abridge freedom of speech and of assembly is the exception rather than the rule.
. . . The limitation upon individual liberty must have appropriate relation to the
safety of the state." °3 In Gitlow it had been declared that every presumption was
to be indulged in to favor the validity of the statute. When a state statute is
challenged under the due process clause this is the normal presumption; it is used
to decide whether the challenged statute is a reasonable state measure. The pre-
sumption was relaxed here, the Court requiring more than mere "reasonableness"
inasmuch as the statute affected freedom of speech.
It would seem that the Lowry case had made the clear and present danger test
the rule of the majority once more and that the bad tendency test had been
abandoned. However, this position was short-lived, for the cases which followed
the Lowry decision were perhaps in even more confusion than those before it.
II. THE ROOSEVELT COURT AND THE PREFEaRED PosrrioN DocMwn
Beginning in 1937 and ending around 1949, the Supreme Court took a some-
what different view of the constitutional status of first amendment freedoms. This
28. However, during that same period two other state court convictions for
subversive utterances were reversed for lack of evidence proving that the defendant
had actually advocated criminal conduct to effect industrial or political change. De
Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937); Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380 (1927).
29. 301 U.S. 242 (1937). In addition to the portion of the Lowry case discussed
in the text, another portion dealt with the indefiniteness of the statute as construed
by the State court. The Court apparently applied the clear and present danger test
to invalidate the statute on the -basis of indefiniteness, which was an application not
in accord with Mr. Justice Holmes' view. See Lusk, supra note 7, at 585.
30. Id. at 258.
19611
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period was characterized by a fairly consistent determination to protect civil
liberties and in doing so the Court gave first amendment freedoms a "preferred
position" in the constitutional hierarchy of values. Those favoring this view took
the position that it was the intention of Mr. Justice Holmes to ignore the usual
"reasonableness" approach in areas where legislative action impinged upon civil
liberties and to substitute therefor the clear and present danger test. They felt
that even though the reasonableness rule was appropriate to test legislation in
other areas, where basic first amendment freedoms were at stake the Court should
hold legislatures to a higher standard. The reasonableness theory placed the burden
of proof of unconstitutionality upon the person attacking the legislation; Lowry
seemed to shift this burden to the defenders of legislation which restricted first
amendment freedoms. Thus, while the Court adhered to the philosophy that in
economic matters it would not look into the wisdom of the legislature, the same
did not hold true where civil liberties were concerned.
The clear and present danger and preferred position doctrines were not op-
posing theories; both were manifestations of the same judicial attitude. In fact,
the preferred position argument reinforced the clear and present danger test and
supplied its raison d'etre. In order to justify legislative abridgment of these pre-
ferred, fundamental rights, the Court demanded persuasive showing of a clear
and present danger to the security or welfare of the state or nation. The preferred
position view was not a judicial theory which was raised and accepted in one
stroke. In fact, never did it gain the support of a unanimous Court. It evolved
through a number of opinions representing sometimes the majority and sometimes
a dissenting view.
One of the earliest and important contributions to the preferred position view
came in an opinion by Mr. Justice Cardozo in 1937. In speaking of the first
amendment he said:
... [Olne may say that it is the matrix, the indispensable condition, of
nearly every other form of freedom. . . . So it has come about that the
domain of liberty, withdrawn by the Fourteenth Amendment from en-
croachment by the states, has been enlarged by latter-day judgments to
include liberty of the mind as well as liberty of action.al
Mr. Justice Cardozo intimated that the first amendment transcends the others
and must -be given closer protection by the Court.
Herndon v. Lowry had indicated that the presumption which was normally
engaged in to favor legislative action might not be applicable where first amend-
ment freedoms were at stake. However, credit for this innovation is usually given
to Mr. Justice Stone who mentioned it in a case which dealt with economic legis-
lation and, therefore, in which the usual presumption was applied. The case was
United States v. Carolene Prod. Co.,32 wherein Mr. Justice Stone placed the
following language in a footnote:
31. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 327 (1937).
32. 304 U.S. 144 (1938). The case involved the application of a congressional
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There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of
constitutionality when legislation appears on its face to be within a specific
prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten amendments,
which are deemed equally specific when held to be embraced within the
Fourteenth....
It is unnecessary to consider now whether legislation which restricts
those political processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about
repeal of undesirable legislation, is to be subjected to more exacting
judicial scrutiny under the general prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment than are most other types of legislation. .... 33
The language not only indicated that the presumption might be waived when
dealing with a statute which restricted important constitutional rights, but also
that the judiciary has a specific responsibility as defender of those liberties prereq-
uisite to the purity of political processes.3 4
The pronouncement was at most a tentative and qualified one. However, the
idea leaped from the footnote into a majority opinion, in which Mr. Justice
Frankfurter, who was strongly against the preferred position doctrine, joined. In
Sckneider v. New Jersey,35 speaking through Mr. Justice Roberts the Court said:
In every case, therefore, where legislative abridgment of the rights is
asserted, the courts should be astute to examine the effect of the chal-
lenged legislation. Mere legislative preferences or beliefs respecting mat-
ters of public convenience may well support regulation directed at other
personal activities, but be insufficient to justify such as diminishes the
exercise of rights so vital to the maintenance of democratic institutions.- G
While there was no mention of "preferred position," the opinion dealt with a num-
ber of ordinances placing restrictions on the distribution of handbills and the State
was placed in the position of having to prove the reasonableness and necessity of
the means selected.
In Thornhill v. Alabama,37 a State statute which made peaceful picketing a
misdemeanor was held invalid on its face. Mr. Justice Murphy, writing the
majority opinion, said that it was incumbent on the courts "to weigh the circum-
stances" and "appraise the substantiality of the reasons advanced" in testing a
regulation which would abridge a fundamental freedom.38 The net effect was to
apply the clear and present danger test in a case unlike those in which Justices
Holmes and Brandeis would have applied it:
.. Holmes and Brandeis never employed the test to determine the con-
stitutionality of the statute itself; in every case the test was used to de-
termine whether the statute had been constitutionally applied-their
position being that a statute used to abridge speech could be validly
33. Id. at 152, n. 4.
34. Mason, The Core of Free Government, 1938-1940: Mr. Justice Stone and
"Preferred Freedoms," 65 YALE L.J. 597, 601-02 (1956).
35. 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
36. Id. at 161.
37. 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
38. Id. at 96.
1961]
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applied only to those speeches and publications which in fact created a
clear and present danger to the security of the state. Of course, Holmes
and Brandeis would not have hesitated to strike down a statute which
arbitrarily and without basis abridged freedom of speech. But in doing so
they would not, so far as appears from their opinions, have applied the
test of clear and present danger.2 9
Mr. Justice Frankfurter stood with the majority in Thornhill even though
the clear and present danger test was there exalted, and, later the same year, he
agreed with the invalidation of a state statute which prohibited persons from
carrying on house-to-house solicitation for religious purposes without prior approval
of a public official.40 However, in 1940 Mr. Justice Frankfurter wrote the majority
opinion in Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis41 which approved a compulsory flag
salute and in which he repudiated any preferred position which might be given
first amendment freedoms. The majority found the prescribed ceremony to be
rationally related to the purpose of fostering national unity which was "an interest
inferior to none in the hierarchy of legal values. '42 This was a manifestation of
the so-called "reasonable basis" approach of which more will be seen later.43
Mr. Justice Stone was the lone dissenter in Gobitis. He felt that even though
national cohesion was a desired end, it could not be gained through compulsion
and force.4" He once more seemed to imply a constitutional "preference" for the
first amendment when he asserted:
The Constitution expresses more than the conviction of the people
that democratic processes must be preserved at all costs. It is also an
expression of faith and a command that freedom of mind and spirit must
be preserved, which government must obey, if it is to adhere to that justice
and moderation without which no free government can exist. For this rea-
son it would seem that legislation which operates to repress the religious
freedom of small minorities, which is admittedly within the scope of the
protection of the Bill of Rights, must at least be subject to the same
judicial scrutiny as legislation which we have recently held to infringe
the constitutional liberty of religious and racial minorities.45
Although standing alone in his dissent, he was highly praised for his stand.46
A majority of the Court again rejected any idea of "preferred position" in
Milk Wagon Drivers Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies.'7 It was there concluded by
39. Lusk, sulpra note 7, at 585.
40. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
41. 310 U.S. 586 (1940). The Gobitis children had refused to join other pupils
in the flag salute, as ordained by the school board. For them the flag salute violated
the Biblical injunction against bowing down to a graven image.
42. Id. at 595.
43. Infra pp. 490-98.
44. CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 565 (1941).
45. Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, supra note 41, at 606-07 (dissenting
opinion).
46. See Mason, supra note 34, at 620, wherein he discusses the trend of public
opinion to the Gobitis decision.
47. 312 U.S. 287 (1941).
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the majority, through Mr. Justice Frankfurter, that a state had a right to protect
its citizens from acts of violence which justified restraint of the right to picket.
Thornhill and Carlson" were approved, the Court making a distinction between
statutes which prohibited picketing in general and those wherein violence had
given the picketing a coercive effect.49 The significance of the case was, however,
in the fact that Justices Black and Douglas broke from the majority and joined
Mr. Justice Stone'in adopting a more liberal view with respect to first amendment
freedoms. Through Mr. Justice Black they declared that the right to picket, even
in a "context of violence," was a constitutionally protected freedom of expression
which could not be proscribed on the ground that the State had a "reasonable
basis" for so doing. 0 Again a preferred status was implied when it was asserted:
In determining whether the injunction does deprive petitioners of
their constitutional liberties, we cannot and should not lose sight of the
nature and importance of the particular liberties that are at stake. And in
reaching my conclusion I view the guaranties of the First Amendment
as the foundation upon which our governmental structure rests and with-
out which it could not continue to endure as conceived and planned.
Freedom to speak and write about public questions is as important to the
life of our government as is the heart to the human body. In fact, this
'privilege is the heart of our government. If that heart be weakened, the
result is debilitation; if it be stilled, the result is death.51
The dissenting view in Meadowmoor became, to an extent at least, the majority
view in Bridges v. Californa,52 decided in 1941. There, a State court had acted
on the basis of its general common law powers without the benefit of statute, and
in doing so punished publications which dealt with pending litigation. The clear
and present danger language again appeared and there seemed to be a preferred
position given to freedom of speech:
What finally emerges from the "clear and present danger" cases is a
working principle that the substantive evil must be extremely serious and
the degree of imminence extremely high before utterances can be punished.
Those cases do not purport to mark the furthermost constitutional
boundaries of protected expression, nor do we here. They do no more than
recognize a minimum compulsion of the Bill of Rights. For the First
Amendment does not speak equivocally. It prohibits any law "abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press." It must be taken as a command of the
broadest scope that explicit language, read in the context of a liberty-
loving society, will allow." (Emphasis added.)
48. Carlson v. California, 310 U.S. 106 (1940). The Carlson case was decided
the same day as Thornhill v. Alabama, s-upra note 37; it invalidated a city ordinance
similar to the statute involved in Thornhill.
49. Milk Wagon Drivers Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies, supra note 47, at 297.
50. Id. at 307 (dissenting opinion).
51. Id. at 301-02 (dissenting opinion).
52. 314 U.S. 252 (1941).
53. Id. at 263.
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Mr. Justice Frankfurter dissented. He felt that state action seeking to assure
the impartial accomplishment of justice was not an abridgement of either freedom
of speech or of press.
Until this time the phrase "preferred position" had not actually been used in
an opinion, although that idea had been suggested by some of the Justices. Mr. Jus-
tice Frankfurter had been attempting to minimize the use of the clear and present
danger test and at the same time repudiate any idea of a preferred position for first
amendment freedoms. His argument against the clear and present danger test,
from which the preferred position argument draws life, was that it was being used
for a purpose other than that which Mr. Justice Holmes contemplated; that was,
to determine the constitutionality of legislation rather than as a test of the appli-
cation of a statute." Although in 1942 a majority of the Justices were reflecting
the views of Mr. Justice Frankfurter, the strong dissent in Gobitis must have had
some influence, for, assisted by public reaction, it seemed to promote reflection and
reappraisal by certain members of the Gobitis majority. This is indicated by the
relative positions on the Court in the Meadowmoor and Bridges cases.
The first use of the term "preferred position" occurred in Mr. Chief Justice
Stone's dissenting opinion in Jones v. Opelika.55 The Court there held valid an
ordinance which imposed a license tax on the privilege of selling books and pamph-
lets on the streets or from house to house. The Jehovah's Witnesses had violated
the ordinance and the majority felt that the sales involved commercial transactiong
and were not of a religious nature. Mr. Chief Justice Stone" would have held
the ordinance invalid on its face and toward this end he asserted:
The First Amendment is not confined to safeguarding freedom of
speech and freedom of religion against discriminatory attempts to wipe
them out. On the contrary, the Constitution, by virture of the First and
Fourteenth Amendments, has put those freedoms in a preferred position.
Their commands are not restricted to cases where the protected privilege
is sought out for attack. They extend at least to every form of taxation
which, because it is a condition of the exercise of a privilege, is capable
of being used to control or suppress it.57
Justices Black, Douglas, and Murphy joined in the Chief Justice's views. All three
were members of the Gobitis majority and they took Opelika as an opportunity to
express the view that Gobitis had been wrongly decided.
In October of 1942, Mr. Justice Byrnes, a member of the Opelika majority,
resigned and Mr. Justice Rutledge succeeded him. Four days after Mr. Justice
Rutledge took his seat, the Court granted certiorari in Murdock v. Pennsylvanias
and ordered reargument of Opelika." Justices Black, Douglas, Murphy and Rut-
54. PRITCHErr, CIVIL LIBERTIES AND THE VINSON COURT 31 (1954).
55. 316 U.S. 584 (1942).
56. Mr. Justice Stone was commissioned Chief Justice in July of 1941.
57. Jones v. Opelika, supra note 55, at 608 (dissenting opinion).
58. 318 U.S. 748 (1942).
59. Jones v. City of Opelika, 318 U.S. 796 (1942).
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ledge, and Mr. Chief Justice Stone formed the majority and reversed the Opelika
case.60 The Court, through the same group, rendered a judgment favorable to
the Jehovah's Witnesses in Mardock,61 which involved the sect's distribution of
religious literature in violation of a city ordinance requiring all persons canvassing
or soliciting for wares, goods, or such to obtain a license. In holding the ordinance
violative of the first amendment, Mr. Justice Rutledge, writing for the majority,
said:
The fact that the ordinance is "nondiscriminatory" is immaterial.
The protection afforded by the First Amendment is not so restricted. A
license tax certainly does not acquire constitutional validity because it
classifies the privileges protected by the First Amendment along with the
wares and merchandise of hucksters and peddlers and treats them all
alike. Such equality in treatment does not save the ordinance. Freedom
of press, freedom of speech, freedom of religion are in a preferred po-
sition.62
Justices Frankfurter, Jackson, Reed, and Roberts were now in the minority. With
the retirement of Mr. Justice Byrnes and the appointment of Mr. Justice Rutledge
there was a reversal of the Court's attitude in the first Opelika case. The new
majority view prevailed again in a decision handed down the same day as Mur.
dock. 3
In West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnetter4 Mr. Justice Jackson's position
made the majority even stronger. He had previously been antagonistic to the
preferred position philosophy but in this case he endorsed the view in the strongest
of terms. He felt that the courts must be cautious in holding legislation invalid
on ordinary due process grounds because of the indefiniteness of the standard.
However, he asserted that the definiteness of the first amendment permits the
replacement of the "reasonableness" test by considerably stricter standards.65
Drawing heavily on Mr. Justice Stone's dissent in Gobitis, Mr. Justice Jackson
said that:
60. Jones v. Opelika, 319 U.S. 103 (1943).
61. Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943).
62. Id. at 115.
63. Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943). This case involved a
Jehovah's Witness-who was convicted for violation of an ordinance which forbade
any person to knock on doors, ring doorbells, or otherwise summon to the door
occupants of any residence for the purpose of distributing handbills or circulars. The
Court held that the ordinance, as applied to a person distributing advertisements
for a religious meeting, was invalid as a denial of freedom of speech and 'Press. See
also, Taylor v. Mississippi, 319 U.S. 583 (1943), where the Court invalidated a
statute which sought to punish as a criminal, one who teaches resistance to govern-
mental compulsion to salute.
64. 319 U.S. 624 (1943). The State Board of Education had adopted a resolu-
tion requiring the flag salute of both pupils and teachers. To refuse meant "insub-
ordination"; insubordination meant expulsion; expulsion made a child a delinquent;
and delinquency subjected both child and parents to prosecution. Walter Barnette
and several other Jehovah's Witnesses sued to enjoin enforcement of the resolution
claiming that it violated the first and fourteenth amendments.
65. PRiTcH=T, op. cit. supra note 54, at 35.
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Much of the vagueness of the due process clause disappears when the spe-
cific prohibitions of the First [amendment] become its standard. The right
of a State to regulate, for example, a public utility may well include, so
far as the due process test is concerned, power to impose all of the restric-
tions which a legislature may have a "rational basis" for adopting. But
freedoms of speech and of press, of assembly, and of worship may not be
infringed on such slender grounds. They are susceptible of restriction only
to prevent grave and immediate danger to interests which the State may
lawfully protect .... "(
He strengthened this argument when he went on to conclue that:
If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that
no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics,
nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to con-
fess by word or act their faith therein. If there are any circumstances which
permit an exception, they do not now occur to us.67
Mr. Justice Frankfurter dissented. He felt that inasmuch as the legislatures
are responsible directly to the people, the duty of legislating lies with them. Further,
he asserted that the Court's very narrow function is to "determine whether within
the broad grant of authority vested in legislatures they have exercised a judgment
for which reasonable justification can be offered."68
The libertarian majority did not find Mr. Justice Jackson's support in another
Jehovah's Witnesses case69 the following year, but the Court was near unanimity
as to result. The majority opinion was written by Mr. Justice Rutledge. The Court
upheld, as an appropriate exercise of police power, a statute which prohibited
children from selling or exercising any trade in a public place, and penalizing
anyone furnishing them with merchandise for such purposes. The opinion asserted
that the first amendment was deserving of a "preferred position," but, nevertheless,
the State's interest in the welfare and protection of children was greater than the
interests of religious expression or parental authority insofar as the case was con-
cerned. Justices Jackson, Roberts, and Frankfurter concurred and would have
upheld the statute as regulating "commercial" activities. They believed that ac-
tions for the -purpose of raising money, even when conducted by religious groups,
were affairs of Caesar rather than of God and subject to the restraint of the State.70
Mr. Justice Murphy took a more liberal view than any of his associates. He
would have condemned the statute on either of the grounds dealt with by the
other opinions. In doing so he would give the statute a presumption of invalidity
as it restricted first amendment freedoms:
In dealing with the validity of statutes which directly or indirectly
infringe religious freedom and the right of parents to encourage their chil-
dren in the practice of religious belief, we are not aided by any strong
66. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, supi4a note 63, at 639.
67. Id. at 642.
68. Id. at 649 (dissenting opinion).
69. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
70. Barnett, Mr. Justice Murpy, Civil Liberties and thve Holmes Tradition,
32 CORNELL L.Q. 177, 200 (1946).
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presumption of the constitutionality of such legislation. . . .On the con-
trary, the human freedoms enumerated in the First Amendment and car-
ried over into the Fourteenth Amendment are to be presumed to be in-
vulnerable and any attempt to sweep away those freedoms is prima fade
invalid. It follows that any restriction or prohibition must be justified by
those who deny that the freedoms have been unlawfully invaded.".
A short time later, in Follett v. Town of McCormick,"2 the Court invalidated,
over the dissents of Justices Frankfurter, Roberts, and Jackson, a local ordinance
which exacted a book agents' license fee for distributing literature. The appellant
earned his livelihood entirely from "contributions" requested in return for religious
literature which he distributed. The majority found that the activity was "re-
ligious," but the dissenters contended it was "commercial" and that the appellant
should bear his part of the community expenses.
Thus, at the close of 1944, the "preferred position" concept had gained enough
support to -bring it from the form of suggestion in a footnote in the Carolene
case, to the prevailing attitude on the Court. However, as indicated, the Justices
were not unanimous in this view and sharp splits characterized most of the cases
involving the problem.
What were likely the strongest implications of the preferred position view,
as well as the peak of its employment, can be found in Thomas v. Collins73 and
Mars. v. Alabama.74 The following passage from Mr. Justice Rutledge's opinion
in Collins may be taken as a summary of the liberal view of the majority in 1945:
The case confronts us again with the duty our system places on this
Court to say where the individual's freedom ends and the State's power
-begins. Choice on that border, now as always delicate, is perhaps more so
where the usual presumption supporting legislation is balanced by the pre-
ferred place given in our scheme to the great, the indispensable demo-
cratic freedoms secured by the First Amendment. That priority gives these
liberties a sanctity and a sanction not permitting dubious intrusions. And
it is the character of the right, not of the limitation, which determines
what standard governs the choice.
71. Prince v. Massachusetts, supra note 69, at 173 (dissenting opinion).
72. 321 U.S. 573 (1944). The facts in this case were similar to those in Mur-
dock, but here Follet was a resident of the town, and confined his activities to the
community. In Murdock, on the other hand, the ordinance dealt with itinerant
evangelists.
73. 323 U.S. 516 (1945). This case involved the validity of a Texas statute
which required union organizers to register with the Secretary of State before
soliciting memberships. Thomas, who was president of the UAW, had scheduled a
speech before a group of employees. Prior to the speech he was enjoined from
solicitation unless he registered as required. In the speech, Thomas invited one
nonunion man to join the Oil Workers Industrial Union. The State court, holding
Thomas in contempt, considered the whole speech and assembly to be a "solicita-
tion," basing its ruling on the single invitation. The Supreme Court restricted the
issue to whether the registration statute could be validly applied to one speaking at
a peaceful assembly on the benefits of the labor movement. By so restricting the
issue, and holding only the particular application invalid, the Court was able to
preserve the statute.
74. 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
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For these reasons any attempt to restrict those liberties must be
justified by clear public interest, threatened not doubtfully or remotely,
but by clear and present danger. The rational connection between the
remedy provided and the evil to be curbed, which in other contexts might
support legislation against attack on due process grounds, will not suffice.
These rights rest on firmer foundation. Accordingly, whatever occasion
would restrain orderly discussion and persuasion, at appropriate time and
place, must have clear support in public danger, actual or impending. Only
the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests, give occasion for per-
missible limitation. It is therefore in our tradition to allow the widest
room for discussion, the narrowest range for its restriction, particularly
when this right is exercised in conjunction with peaceable assembly. . ..5
One commentator has said that in the opinion Mr. Justice Rutledge employed a
'psychological approach, but an influential one." That is, Mr. Justice Rutledge
felt that the clear and present danger principle placed a heavy burden on govern-
ment to justify infringements of those preferred freedoms guaranteed by the first
amendment7 6 It must be noted, however, that this was the view of only four
Justices, for Mr. Justice Jackson, who supplied the fifth vote in Thomas v. Coilins,
concurred on other grounds.
A further, and yet perhaps stronger, indication of the preference which the
majority was willing to give to first amendment freedoms occurred in Marsh v.
Alabama,77 in which those freedoms prevailed over the rights of an owner of
private property. The Court held, in invalidating a statute which made it a crime
to enter upon or remain on premises of another after being warned not to do so,
that a person could remain on private property without the owner's permission
and contrary to State law so long as the only objection to his presence was that
he was exercising an asserted right to express his religious views. Mr. Justice Black
wrote the opinion. He reasoned that when the constitutional rights of owners of
property were balanced against those of the people to enjoy freedom of speech or
religion, the "latter occupy a preferred position."7 It should again be noted that
while the Court was concerned with the matter here being emphasized-the matter
of giving first amendment freedoms a preferred status-the clear and present
danger formula was still important. Its use was to determine whether a particular
publication or utterance was of such a nature to warrant its restriction.9
7
75. Thomas v. Collins, supra note 73, at 529-30.
76. Mann, Rutledge and Civil Liberties, 25 IND. L.J. 532, 538-39 (1950).
77. Supra note 74. Grace Marsh, a Jehovah's Witness, was distributing religious
literature on the streets of Chickasaw, a town privately owned by Gulf Shipbuild-
ing Corporation. She was warned not to distribute without a permit, and was
arrested upon her refusal to obtain one.
78. Id. at 509.
79. See Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331 (1946). A paper had published
two editorials and a cartoon criticizing certain actions previously taken by a
Florida trial court as being too favorable to criminals and gambling establishments.
Petitioners were convicted of contempt of court in that the publication reflected on
the court's integrity, tended to create a distrust for the court, and also tended to
obstruct the fair and impartial justice of pending cases. The Supreme Court un-
animously held that this conviction was in violation of the petitioners' rights to
free speech and press.
[Vol. 26
16
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 26, Iss. 4 [1961], Art. 9
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol26/iss4/9
COMMENT
During 1946 a significant change occurred in the composition of the Court.
Mr. Chief Justice Stone, perhaps the chief proponent of the preferred position,
died. President Truman appointed Fred M. Vinson to the post of Chief Justice
and, as a result, the "preferred position" libertarians were once more a minority.
In United Public Workers of America v. Mitchell,80 the Court, over the dissents
of Justices Black, Douglas, and Rutledge, repudiated the preferred position doc-
trine while upholding the validity of the Hatch Act which limited the political
activity of government employees. The act required the removal from jobs of
those who took an active part in political management or in political campaigns.
However, certainty in deciding cases concerning first amendment freedoms
was not yet insured for, contrary to the implications of Mitchell, a majority of
the Court once again endorsed a preferred status for such freedoms in Saia v.
New York."" The Court invalidated a city ordinance which prohibited the use of
sound equipment without permission of the chief of police. This was found to
be an intolerable limitation on the right of free speech. Mr. Justice Douglas,
speaking for the majority, felt that it was the Court's responsibility to:
[Blalance the various community interests in passing on the constitu-
tionality of local regulations of the character involved here. But in that
process they should be mindful to keep the freedoms of the first amend-
ment in a preferred position.82
In spite of Saia the preferred position doctrine had run its course and the
last case in which it had any significance was United States v. C.I.O.,8 and then
only in a concurrence by Mr. Justice Rutledge who argued in favor of the reversed
presumption idea thusly:
As the Court has declared repeatedly, that judgment does not bear
the same weight and is not entitled to the same presumption of validity,
when the legislation on its face or in specific application restricts the
rights of conscience, expression and assembly protected by the Amend-
ment, as are given to other regulations having no such tendency. The
presumption rather is against the legislative intrusion into these domains.84
The reversal of the usual presumption of constitutionality of statutes when they
restricted or abridged the freedoms of speech, press, religion, or assembly was
the crux and the strength of the preferred position argument. This idea embedded
itself into the attitudes and opinions of a majority of the Justices during the 1940's.
80. 330 U.S. 75 (1947).
81. 334 U.S. 558 (1948).
82. Id. at 562.
83. 335 U.S. 106 (1948). The case grew out of the Taft-Hartley Act's restric-
tions on expenditures in political campaigns. Any comment on or participation in
elections by labor newspapers were prohibited if they were supported by general
union funds. The labor organization and its president were indicted for making
expenditures from the funds of the union for publication of an editorial in the C.I.O.
News, urging members to vote for a particular candidate in a special congressional
election held in Maryland. The Court held that these expenditures were not within
the prohibition of the statute.
84. Id. at 140 (concurring opinion).
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However, at no time did the argument enjoy unanimous approval by the Court.
Nevertheless, the phrase was employed often enough, and by enough of the
Justices, to insure against, at least to an extent, legislative action which would
place arbitrary limitations on the first amendment liberties.
III. THE MODERN CONSERVATIVE COURT
A. Decline of the Preferred Position and Clear and Present Danger Doctrines
As indicated, the exalted state that characterized the first amendment liberties
was to lose popularity with a majority of the Court. Evidence of this decline
came in Kovacs v. Cooper,85 which arose out of the operation of a sound truck
in Trenton, New Jersey, in violation of a city ordinance. The city made unlawful
the operation of sound trucks or similar amplifying devices emitting "loud and
raucous" noises on the public streets. Mr. Justice Reed, for the Court, interpreted
the ordinance as prohibiting only loud and raucous sound trucks and not prohibit-
ing all such trucks in general. He saved the ordinance in this manner, but it was
not made clear whether a sound truck could be operated other than in a loud
and raucous manner. If not, the decision would seemingly overrule Saia. However,
Mr. Justice Reed distinguished the two cases; the ordinance in Saia established
a previous restraint on free speech, whereas the Trenton ordinance was aimed at
preventing disturbing noises. He alluded to a preferred position for freedom of
speech, but asserted that it did not mean that legislators had to be insensible to
the comfort and convenience of the citizens. The reference to "preferred position"
brought an outburst from Mr. Justice Frankfurter in a concurring opinion. He
deemed it a mischevious phrase if it carried the thought, which it seems to
imply, that "any law touching communication is infected with presumptive in-
validity."8 6
Although the reversed presumption was on the way out following Kovacs,
in the same year the Court invalidated an ordinance prohibiting any misconduct
which led to a "breach of peace."' A coalition of Justices Reed, Black, Douglas,
Murphy, and Rutledge concluded that speech could not be censored or punished
on the grounds that it might "invite dispute" or "bring about a condition of
unrest," but only where it was "shown likely to produce a clear and present
danger of a serious substantive evil that rises far above public inconvenience,
annoyance, or unrest."- The libertarians had won another battle, -but the victory
was to be only temporary. Even Mr. Justice Jackson, who had once strongly
accepted the preferred position language,s ° was now rejecting it, his feeling being
85. 336 U.S. 77 (1949).
86. Id. at 90 (concurring opinion).
87. Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949). The case arose out of a Fascist-
type speech made by Terminiello, a Catholic priest, in a Chicago auditorium. Fol-
lowing the speech and the disturbance which accompanied it, Terminiello was con-
victed of disorderly conduct.
88. Id. at 4.
89. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, sulpra note 64.
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that select constitutional rights could not be given a preferred position without
others being relegated to a deferred position.90
The year 1949 brought about significant changes in the Court's personnel.
Justices Murphy and Rutledge passed away; they had been strong libertarians,
along with Justices Black and Douglas. President Truman filled the vacancies
with appointments of Tom C. Clark and Sherman Minton. The initial effect was
to put the more conservative view of Justices Frankfurter, Burton, Reed, Jackson
and the Chief Justice in a strong majority as Justices Clark and Minton joined
in their views. The net effect was, however, to cast the liberal preferred position
view permanently out of use by a majority of the Court, which is at least under-
standable, no matter what one's individual view might be, when the doctrine is
considered in its historical setting. The late forties were characterized by fears and
uncertainties which tended to create a sense of conservatism in American politics
and national life. This was largely the result of the threat of the cold war and
the division of the larger part of the world into two hostile elements-Communist
and anti-Communist. The period also witnessed exposure of Communist infiltration
into government, labor unions, and other important areas. The Supreme Court
reflected, to a degree, this atmosphere of conservatism, especially in the field of
civil liberties. From a determination to protect civil liberties, the Court's attitude
changed to a determination to maintain national security.91 "As some libertarian
wag might put it-our First Amendment freedoms moved from a 'preferred' to a
'deferred' position, their protection being deferred to some future time, less critical
and less emotion-packed."9 2
Aierican Communications Ass'n v. Douds,93 furnished the first indication that
the Court regarded the clear and present danger test a poor weapon to protect
national security. The challenged statute was the Taft-Hartley Act which required
labor union officers to sign non-Communist affidavits as a prerequisite to a union's
use of NLRB services. In holding the statute not violative of the first amend-
ment, Mr. Chief Justice Vinson said that Congress was seeking to prevent political
strikes and that the clear and present danger principle could not apply because
the statute did not interfere with speech. He felt that this was a commercial
regulation and a valid exercise of the commerce power. Indicating that the clear
and present danger test should be discarded in favor of a balancing of interests,
the Chief Justice said that:
When the effect of a statute or ordinance upon the exercise of First
Amendment freedoms is relatively small and the public interest to be pro-
tected is substantial, it is obvious that a rigid test requiring a showing of
imminent danger to the security of the Nation is an absurdity.94
90. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 180 (1949) (dissenting opinion).
91. The Court continued to decide cases in which civil rights or civil liberties
were involved, emphasizing that it had not abdicated from its position as protector
in these areas. However, as the cases indicate, the emphasis had changed.
92. Lusk, The Present Status of the "Clear and Present Danger Test"--A
Brief History and Some Observations, 45 Ky. L.J. 576, 597 (1957).
93. 339 U.S. 382 (1950).
94. Id. at 397.
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It should be noted, however, that although the conservative element of the
Court, led by Justices Frankfurter and Jackson, was not willing to accept a "pre-
ferred" status for first amendment freedoms, neither was it willing to defer com-
pletely the freedoms to a point of religious discrimination through the use of
local licensing requirements."o
B. The Emergence of the Balancing Test
In the early 1950's, it became clear that the Supreme Court was looking upon
legislation restricting the first amendment freedoms with a more conservative
approach. The "reasonable-basis" or "balancing" test was a manifestation of this
outlook. The application of the test involved a balancing of two interests: the
interest of the state in the welfare and security of its citizens, on the one hand,
and the interest of the individual in respect to his first amendment guarantees,
on the other. Where there was, by statute or otherwise, a significant encroachment
upon personal liberty, the state could prevail only upon showing a subordinating
interest which was compelling. This approach had been used before,98 in fact, even
the preferred position libertarians applied a balance, but on one side of the scale
was the weight of the first amendment which occupied a "preferred" place.9 7
In a series of three cases, in 1951, the Court employed the balancing of
interests view to uphold restrictions upon first amendment freedoms. The first of
these was Feiner v. New York,98 involving a "riotous" speech made by a university
student wherein he, in a "loud, high-pitched voice," spoke derogatorily about
President Truman, Mayor O'Dwyer of New York, and the American Legion. The
student was arrested and convicted on a disorderly conduct charge. Speaking for
a six-man majority, Mr. Chief Justice Vinson recognized that Feiner had a right
to speak, but denied him the right to "incite a riot." The student was "neither
arrested nor convicted for the making or the content of his speech. Rather, it
was the reaction which it actually engendered." Thus, the Court respected the
community interest, and placed it above the right of Feiner to speak his mind
in the manner which he did.
The second of these cases was Dennis v. United States,99 which made it
evident that the Court was a conservative one, desirous of insuring national security.
Eleven leaders of the American Communist Party had been convicted of violations
95. See Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951). This case involved a
group of Jehovah's Witnesses who were giving talks in a public park. The use of
the park was not regulated, but it was a custom to obtain a permit before making
speeches. The group was refused a permit because of its religious views, so it
held the meeting without one. The Court unanimously held that the conduct of
the speaker had been orderly and that the basis for the charge was the failure
to have a permit. The Court found that there had been "unwarranted discrimina-
tion" not compatible with the Constitution.
96. Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, suspra note 41.
97. See, Saia v. New York, supra note 81; Marsh v. Alabama, supra note 74.
98. 340 U.S. 315 (1951).
99. 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
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of the Smith Act.100 The Court was faced with the problem of reconciling, with
the guarantees of free speech, a statute which treated the advocacy and teaching
of the overthrow of the Government by force and violence as a criminal offense 1 01
Mr. Chief Justice Vinson, speaking for the Court, reinterpreted the clear and
present danger test in affirming the conviction. He did not go so far as the
majority had gone in Gitlow, but took a position that had been used by Judge
Learned Hand,10 2 asking: "whether the gravity of the 'evil,' discounted by its im-
probability, justifies such invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the
danger.' 0 3 Neither did the Chief Justice go so far as Justices Holmes and Brandeis
would have gone in Gitlow in the other direction, that is, that the Court should
affirm statutes only if the likelihood of success for the subversive activity is
immediate and pressing; his was a middle ground. Justices Jackson and Frank-
furter also added their interpretations of the case; they would again reject the
clear and present danger test, apply the balancing test, and conclude that the
weight was in favor of an invasion of speech. Mr. Justice Black, dissenting, would
have held section three of the Smith Act invalid on its face as a censorship of
free speech and press. He said:
I cannot agree that the First Amendment permits us to sustain laws
suppressing freedom of speech and press on the basis of Congress' or our
own notions of "reasonableness." Such a doctrine waters down the First
Amendment so that it amounts to little more than an admonition to Con-
gress .... 104
Mr. Justice Black felt that the Court was placing too much emphasis on the fear of
the times and the concern over national security. In favoring the once popular
preferred position view, he went on to state that:
* * * [T]here is hope, however, that in calmer times, when present pres-
sures, passions and fears subside, this or some later Court will restore the
First Amendment liberties to the high preferred place where they belong
in a free society.' 05
The last of the three cases was Rreard v. Alexandria.' o The Court upheld
a "Green River Ordinance," in which door-to-door solicitation by itinerant sales-
men of magazine subscriptions was prohibited. Mr. Justice Reed wrote the majority
opinion and in holding that the ordinance did not abridge first amendment liberties,
concluded that communities which had found house to house canvassing "obnoxious"
had such an interest as to justify the right to control it by ordinance. Thus
100. 54 Stat. 670 (1940), 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1958).
101. Section two of the Smith Act made criminal advocacy itself Punishable;
section three of the act went even further in that it made criminal a conspiracy to
advocate. The prosecution involved in Dennis was for a conspiracy to advocate
under section three.
102. United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 212 (2d Cir. 1950).
103. Dennis v. United States, supra note 99, at 510.
104. Id. at 580 (dissenting opinion).
105. Id. at 581 (dissenting opinion).
106. 341 U.S. 622 (1951).
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the Court's conservatism was not limited to those cases in which national security
was at stake. In insisting that the first amendment liberties enjoyed preferred
status, Justices Black and Douglas once again attempted to restore the reversed
presumption in the face of an antagonistic majority.
In 1952 the Court was faced with the case of Beauharn is v. Illinois.107 There,
an Illinois criminal libel statute restricting freedoms of the first amendment was
upheld on the ground that the State had a rational basis for the limitations. The
statute made it unlawful for persons or corporations to publish or exhibit any
writing, picture, drama, or moving picture which portrayed depravity, criminality,
unchastity, or lack of virtue of a class of citizens of any race, color, creed or
religion, which would expose any of these citizens to contempt, derision, or obloquy
or which would be productive of breaches of peace or riots. Mr. Justice Frankfurter,
speaking for a five-man majority, placed libelous speech in the same category as
obscene utterances and said that neither were to be accorded constitutional pro-
tection. In treating the statute as a "group" libel law, he reasoned that since
a state could punish libels directed at individuals, speech which would be libelous
if so directed, could also -be libelous when aimed at a group and individuals were
"inextricably involved" therein. Dissenting, Mr. Justice Black felt that the decision
manifested the shocking results of the reasonable-basis test in the civil liberties
field. He argued that under the Court's view the first amendment was not even
accorded the respect of a passing mention. Mr. Justice Douglas, in a separate
dissent, vigorously disapproved the conservative attitude of the Court, asserting
that:
The First Amendment is couched in absolute terms-freedom of
speech shall not be abridged. Speech has therefore a preferred position
as contrasted to some other civil rights....zos
Mr. Justice Jackson, who usually sided with the conservative element, also dis-
sented. He agreed that the State had power to adopt a group libel law, but took
this opportunity to reiterate the view which he took in the Dennis case. There
he had referred to the clear and present danger doctrine, saying:
I would save it, unmodified, for application as a "rule of reason" in
the kind of case for which it was devised. When the issue is criminality of
a hot-headed speech on a street corner, or circulation of a few incendiary
pamphlets, or parading by some zealots behind a red flag, or refusal of a
handful of school children to salute our flag, it is not beyond the capacity
of the judicial process to gather, comprehend, and weigh the necessary
materials for decision whether it is a clear and present danger of sub-
stantive evil or a harmless letting off of steam. It is not a prophecy, for
the danger in such cases has matured by the time of trial or it was never
present. The test applies and has meaning where a conviction is sought
to be based on a speech or writing which does not directly or explicitly
advocate a crime but to which such tendency is sought to be attributed by
construction or by implication from external circumstances. The formula in
107. 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
108. Id. at 285 (dissenting opinion).
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such cases favors freedoms that are vital to our society, and, even if some-
times applied too generously, the consequences cannot be grave.. .. o9
The attitude of both elements of the Court as they stood in 1953 can be
illustrated by statements found in Poulos v. New Hampshire."10 Mr. Justice Reed
wrote the majority opinion and said:
The principles of the first amendment are not to be treated as a
promise that everyone with opinions or beliefs to express may gather around
him at any public place and at any time a group for discussion or instruc-
tion. It is a non sequitur to say that first amendment rights may not be
regulated because they hold a preferred position in the hierarchy of the
constitutional guarantees of the incidents of freedom. This Court has
never so held and indeed has definitely indicated to the contrary. It
has indicated approval of reasonable nondiscriminatory regulation by gov-
ernmental authority that -preserves peace, order and tranquility without
deprivation of the first amendment guarantees of free speech, press and
the exercise of religion.11
Dissenting, Mr. Justice Douglas distinguished between the clear speech issue
raised in Poulos and the traffic control problem involved in Cox v. New Hamp-
shdre.11 2 He stated that:
An unconstitutional statute is not necessarily a nullity; it may have
intermediate consequences binding upon people .... But when a legislature
undertakes to proscribe the exercise of a citizen's constitutional right to
free speech, it acts lawlessly; and the citizen can take matters in his own
hands and proceed on the basis that such a law is not law at all ...
The reason is the preferred position granted freedom of speech, freedom
of press, freedom of assembly, and freedom of religion by the first
amendment."13
Mr. Justice Douglas concluded that no standards or procedural safeguards could
save a licensing system because even a reasonable regulation of the right of free
speech is not compatible with the first amendment.
As the Court stood at the end of 1953, four of the nine Court members had
been appointed by President Truman. The remaining five were Roosevelt ap-
pointees-Justices Black (1937), Reed (1938), Frankfurter and Douglas (1939),
and Jackson (1941). Mr. Justice Burton was appointed in 1945, Mr. Chief Justice
Vinson in 1946, and Justices Clark and Minton in 1949. Within this Court the
libertarian view of Justices Black and Douglas was in a definite minority. Now,
however, Mr. Chief Justice Vinson and Justices Reed, Jackson, Minton, and Burton
are gone. They were replaced by Mr. Chief Justice Warren and Justices Harlan,
109. Dennis v. United States, suspra note 99, at 568 (concurring opinion).
110. 345 U.S. 395 (1953). Here the Court upheld the validity of a city ordinance
providing for licensing of meetings in public streets or parks. The ordinance was
similar with the language of the state statute unanimously upheld by the Court
in Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941).
111. Poulos v. New Hampshire, supra note 110, at 405.
112. 312 U.S. 569 (1941).
113. Poulos v. New Hampshire, supra note 110, at 422-23 (dissenting opinion).
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Whittaker, Brennan and Stewart. The effect which these five appointments had in
the area of first amendment freedoms is illustrated by a survey of some of the
more recent Court opinions.
The present Court may be sharply divided, for this purpose, into two groups:
five somewhat "conservative" Justices and four "liberals." This characteristic is
brought into focus by two decisions in cases decided in 1959, both of which in-
volved matters affecting internal security.
In Barenblatt v. United States,114 a closely divided Court upheld the conviction
of Lloyd Barenblatt for contempt of Congress. He had refused, while giving testi-
mony before a subcommittee of the House Committee on Un-American Activities,
to answer certain questions regarding his alleged Communist affiliations at the time
of the hearing and at a time when he was a teaching fellow at the University of
Michigan. Mr. Justice Harlan spoke for the majority and placed emphasis on the
congressional power to conduct investigations. In answering the allegation that the
conviction was violative of the appellant's first amendment rights, Mr. Justice
Harlan said that:
Where First Amendment rights are asserted to bar governmental inter-
rogation resolution of the issue always involves a balancing by the
courts of the competing private and public interests at stake in the
particular circumstances shown.115
He concluded that the balance between the individual and the governmental in-
terests at stake was in favor of the latter and that therefore, the provisions of the
first amendment had not been offended. Mr. Justice Black wrote a vigorous dissent
in which the Chief Justice and Justices Douglas and Brennan concurred. Mr. Justice
Black rejected the Court's balancing concept, denying that "laws directly abridg-
ing First Amendment freedoms can be justified by a congressional or judicial bal-
ancing process."116 He agreed that a balancing test might be proper in cases con-
cerned with laws which primarily regulate conduct but which might also indirectly
affect speech if, however, the effect on speech was minor in relation to the need for
control of the conduct. But, he said, laws which are directly aimed at curtailing
speech could not be saved through any -balancing of interests, and furthermore,
even if a balancing were applicable, he argued that the majority was weighing the
wrong factors:
But even assuming what I cannot assume, that some balancing is
proper in this case, I feel that the Court after stating the test ignores it
completely. At most it balances the right of the Government to preserve
itself, against Barenblatt's right to refrain from revealing Communist affilia-
tions. Such a balance, however, mistakes the factors to be weighed. In
the first place, it completely leaves out the real interest in Barenblatt's
silence, the interest of the people as a whole in -being able to join or-
ganizations, advocate causes and make political "mistakes" without later
114. 360 U.S. 109 (1959).
115. Id. at 126.
116. Id. at 141 (dissenting opinion).
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being subjected to governmental penalties for having dared to think
for themselves. 1" 7 (Emphasis added.)
Moreover, the dissenters argued, the Court negated the balancing concept by the
overwhelming weight it gave to the concept of "self-preservation."
Uplhaus v. Wymae"a was handed down the same day as Barenblatt. The same
group of Justices comprised the majority which held that the Attorney General of
New Hampshire, acting as an investigating agency for the State legislature, could
require Uphaus to produce a list of attendants at a summer camp. The legislature
had directed the Attorney General to conduct a probe of subversive activities
within the State. During the investigation, he summoned Uphaus, who was the
Executive Director of World Fellowship, Incorporated. Uphaus refused to comply
with subpoenas calling for the production of certain corporate records and he was
convicted of contempt. In answering the claim that the conviction was violative of
the rights of free speech and association under the first and fourteenth amendments,
Mr. Justice Clark, for the majority, weighed the public interests involved against
the private ones and concluded that the State's interest in "self-preservation" justi-
fied a restriction of the constitutional rights. Mr. Justice Brennan dissented in an
opinion joined in by the Chief Justice and Justices Black and Douglas. The
primary assertion of the dissent was that the record failed to reveal any interest
in the State sufficient to subordinate the petitioner's constitutionally protected
rights. Mr. Justice Brennan felt that the legislative objective of exposure, purely
for the sake of exposure, was not a valid subordinating purpose. Justices Black
and Douglas wrote an additional dissenting opinion in which they asserted that
they would have decided the case on the basis that Uphaus was deprived of his
rights under the first and fourteenth amendments under the principles asserted in
their dissents in Beaukarnais v. Illinois.
The two cases, Barenblatt and Uphaus, indicate the position of the newer
members of the Court and their attitudes concerning the first amendment where
national security is also involved. The dissenting minority in both cases consisted
of the Chief Justice and Justices Black, Douglas and Brennan, and while this
liberal group was determined in its stand, the conservative attitude of the remain-
ing Justices was able to prevail.
It is worthy of note, however, that not always was the majority's balance
struck in favor of the state. The balancing approach was applied in NA.A.C.P. v.
Alabama,"19 but the State's interest was found insufficient to justify constitutional
infringements. Mr. Justice Harlan, a member of the conservative block, there
asserted that when it is shown that state action threatens significantly to impinge
upon constitutionally protected freedoms, the question becomes:
[W]hether .. . [the State] has demonstrated an interest in obtaining
the disclosures it asks ...sufficient to justify the deterrent effect which
117. Id. at 144 (dissenting opinion).
118. 360 U.S. 72 (1959), aff'd per curiam, 364 U.S. 388 (1960).
119. 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
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we have concluded these disclosures may well have on the free exercise
by petitioner members of their constitutionally protected right of asso-
ciation.12 0
Even more recently, however, a majority of the Court members have re-
affirmed their Barenblatt position. In Wilkinson v. United States121 the majority
asserted that the Barenblatt case was indistinguishable and therefore controlled. It
was said that Barenblatt made it clear that "it is the nature of the Communist
activity involved, whether the momentary conduct is legitimate or illegitimate politi-
cally, that establishes the Government's overbalancing interest.122 This position
was followed also in Braden v. United States.123 The majority held that the interest
of the Government in "self-preservation" justified the invasion of petitioner's con-
stitutional rights. Mr. Justice Black, speaking for the libertarians, dissented and
asserted that Barenblatt and Beauharnais should be overruled. He felt that due
to the present trend of cases there was no limit to congressional encroachments in
this area "except such as a majority of this Court may choose to set by a value-
weighing process on a case-by-case basis."1 24 This process, he argued, was a "dan-
gerous trend" and should be stopped before it was too late.
Again reflecting the status of the conservative members of the Court, Com-
munist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd.,125 found the Court upholding
the registration requirements of the 1950 Subversive Activities Control Act126
section seven (a) of which requires all "Communist-action organizations" to register
120. Id. at 463. For a similar holding see Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361
U.S. 516 (1960).
121. 365 U.S. 399 (1961). This case arose out of hearings held by a subcom-
mittee of the House Committee on Un-American Activities, in Atlanta, Georgia,
pursuant to a resolution of the committee directing an investigation of Communist
Party propaganda in the South and Communist infiltration in southern textile and
other industries. The petitioner, a representative of the Emergency Civif Liberties
Committee, decided to go to Atlanta to support opponents of the hearings. Within
an hour after his registration at an Atlanta hotel, he was served with a subpoena
calling for his appearance before the subcommittee. Upon his appearance, a num-
ber of questions were put to him, including questions as to whether he was a mem-
ber of the Communist Party. He refused to answer any of the questions but did
not assert protection under the fifth amendment. He was convicted under a statute
making it a misdemeanor for any person summoned as a witness by either con-
gressional chamber, or a committee thereof, to refuse to answer any question
pertinent to the matter under inquiry. The Court sustained the conviction.
122. Id. at 414.
123. 365 U.S. 431 (1961). In this case the same subcommittee as was involved
in Wilkinson had subpoenaed the defendant, a field representative of the Southern
Conference Educational Fund, an organization active in promoting racial integra-
tion in the South. Braden had drafted and was active in the circulation of two
letters, one calling for defeat of a measure to empower states to enact anti-sedition
statutes and the other opposing the southern hearings of the subcommittee. Braden
was asked if he was a member of the Communist Party at the time he signed the
first letter. Upon his refusal to answer he was declared in contempt and later con-
victed. The Court affirmed the conviction in a five to four decision.
124. Id. at 445 (dissenting opinion).
125. 367 U.S. 1 (1961).
126. 64 Stat. 987, 50 U.S.C. §§ 781-98 (1958).
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with the Attorney General on a form prescribed by him according to his regula-
tions.1 27 Mr. Justice Frankfurter, writing the Court's opinion, applied the balancing
of interest test in reaching the conclusion that the provision was constitutionally
valid:
Against the impediments which particular governmental regulation
causes to entire freedom of individual action, there must be weighed the
value to the public of the ends which the regulation may achieve.128
With respect to the assertion that rights guaranteed by the first amendment had
been infringed upon, Mr. Justice Frankfurter asserted that more was at stake than
the exercise of rights of free speech and assembly. He noted that the congressional
power in this sphere is limited by the first amendment, and that individual liberties
fundamental to American institutions are not to be destroyed under the pretext of
preserving those institutions, even from the gravest external dangers. He went on
to say, however, that:
E . . [Wlhere the problems of accommodating the exigencies of self-
preservation and the values of liberty are as complex and intricate as they
are in the situation described in the findings of § 2 of the Subversive
Activities Control Act-when existing government is menaced by a
world-wide integrated movement which employs every combination of pos-
sible means, peaceful and violent, domestic and foreign, overt and clande-
stine, to destroy the government itself-the legislative judgment as to
how that threat may best be met consistently with the safeguarding of
personal freedom is not to be set aside merely because the judgment
of judges would, in the first instance, have chosen other methods.12
Mr. Justice Black, in a dissenting opinion, reasserted his often-expressed objection to
the balancing test employed by the majority.
In the most recent opinion concerning this problem, Scales v. United States,5 0
the Court upheld a conviction under the Smith Act which makes it a crime to be a
member of an organization which advocates forceful overthrow of the Government
of the United States knowing that to be the view of the organization. The Court,
speaking through Mr. Justice Harlan, rejected the constitutional claim that the
statute infringed upon free political expression in violation of the first amendment.
127. The statute defines a Communist-action organization as one which is con-
trolled by a foreign power controlling the "world Communist movement" and which
operates primarily to advance that movement. The statute establishes a Sub-
versive Activities Control Board which has the duty to determine whether or not
any given organization is a Communist-action organization required to register
under the act. The registration must include the names and addresses of the organi-
zation's present officers and those who were officers within the previous twelve
months and the names and addresses of each individual who was a member during
the same period. Registration statements are to be kept up to date by annual re-
ports.
128. Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., supra note 125,
at 91.
129. Id. at 96-97.
130. 367 U.S. 203 (1961).
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On the argument that the petitioner had a right of freedom of association, the
Court answered that active participation in a party which has illegal aims is not
constitutionally protected. The Court felt that the Dennis case, which upheld the
conspiracy provisions of the Smith Act, disposed of the free speech claims in the
case.13 ' Mr. Justice Black continued to argue for repudiation of the balancing test
used by the majority. In a dissenting opinion he said that the Court's application
of the test in Scales definitely infringed upon freedom of speech, thus indicating the
unlimited breadth and danger of the test as it was being applied by the Court. His
view of the test is indicated by his statement in Scales that:
Under that "test," the question in every case in which a First Amend-
ment right is asserted is not whether there has been an abridgment of
that right, not whether the abridgment of that right was intentional on
the part of the Government, and not whether there is any other way in
which the Government could accomplish a lawful aim without an invasion
of the constitutionally guaranteed rights of the people. It is, rather, simply
whether the Government has an interest in abridging the right involved
and, if so, whether that interest is of sufficient importance, in the opinion
of a majority of this Court, to justify the Government's action in doing
so. This doctrine, to say the very least, is capable of being used to
justify almost any action Government may wish to take to suppress
First Amendment freedoms.132
SOME OBSERVATIONS
In a recent publication of the American Jewish Congress 3s some interesting
and perhaps illuminating statistics were given. It was shown that of the number of
cases decided by the Supreme Court during the 1960-1961 term in which opinions
were written, nearly half were concerned with civil rights or civil liberties matters.
The significance of this fact is brought into sharper focus when compared with the
opinions rendered only twenty-five years ago. In its 1935-1936 term, the Court
handed down one hundred and sixty opinions, only two of which concerned civil
rights or civil liberties.13' This change is radical to the point of being almost revolu-
tionary. The Court, as it stood in 1936, still had as its chief architect Mr. Chief
Justice John Marshall. It had been fashioned by him to be the protector of property
rights and to safeguard commerce, industry and finance from hostile legislatures on
both state and federal levels. Beginning about the time of President Roosevelt's
threatened "packing," however, the Court has abandoned the role fashioned for it
by Mr. Chief Justice Marshall, and has become the nation's guardian of the liber-
ties of the people. Inasmuch as the Court, for the most part, controls its own calen-
131 Id. at 230, n. 21.
132. Id. at 262 (dissenting opinion).
133. COMMISSION ON LAW AND SOCIAL ACTION OF THE AMERICAN JEWISH CON-
GRESS, THE CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES DECISIONS OF THE UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT FOR THE 1960-1961 TERM: A SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS (1961).
134. Id. at 1.
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dar and decides for itself which cases it accepts for consideration, it is clear that
this role has been voluntarily assumed.
It is only fair to note, however, that while it is clear that the Court's increas-
ing concern in this area was begun under a Democratic administration, the majority
of the Justices today were appointed by a Republican President. This indicates
that the Court's concern in this area does not depend upon the party in power or
by whom the Justices are appointed. It is the fact that the Court is repeatedly
hearing this type of case, and not so much in which direction the decisions go,
that indicates that civil rights and civil liberties are of primary concern to the
Court. And, looking to the past twenty-five years for a guide, it appears that this
is a permanent development, or at least a development the termination of which
lies in the indefinite future.
Not so clear as the obvious concern of the Court in this area, is the direction
the Court will take in protecting the liberties of the people. For example, the present
status of the clear and present danger doctrine is not clear. One author 35 has sug-
gested that the heart of the doctrine was extracted in Yates v. United States.sB
However, that case made no mention of the doctrine. Moreover, help may not be
obtained from the Scales case, the most recent on this matter, as the issue of
whether the test would be applied to the membership clause of the Smith Act was
not decided. On the other hand, there seems to be no question that the "preferred
position" philosophy has been abandoned, at least for the present time. One can
only speculate as to whether the phrase will ever be used again, but while Justices
Black and Douglas remain on the Court there is always the possibility that the
phrase will sometime reappear.
For the past decade the Court has been employing a "reasonableness" approach
in settling these questions. Under this view the Court balances the constitutional
guarantees in question against the wisdom and reasonableness of the regulation in
question. But even under this approach the Court has cautioned that freedom of
speech and press must weigh heavily on the scales.137 In applying the balance it
is not possible to determine all of the values which a Justice may have related to a
particular decision. A working hypothesis in decisions involving civil liberties is
that the decision will be influenced by the interaction of two factors:
One is the direction and intensity of a Justice's libertarian sym-
pathies, which will vary according to his weighing of the relative claims
of liberty and order in our society. These positions range from the right
of the individual on the one hand, and the right of the state on the
other. The second factor is the conception which the Justice holds of his
judicial role and the obligations imposed on him by his judicial function188
Ranking the Justices according to these criteria would be difficult, but rank-
ing them in relation to one another is not so difficult. Mr. Chief Justice Warren and
135. Mendelson, Clear and Present Danger-Another Decade, 39 TEXAS L.
REv. 449, 453 (1961).
136. 354 U.S. 298, 340 (1957).
137. American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, supra note 73, at 399-400.
138. ParrcHur, CIVIL LmERTIES AND THE VINSON COURT 191 (1954).
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Justices Black, Douglas, and Brennan side with libertarian claims in an extremely
high number of the cases. This would seem to indicate that while their personal
preferences are strongly libertarian, they also have a conception of their judicial
function which permits them to give effect to these personal preferences. On the
other hand, Justices Frankfurter, Harlan, Whittaker, Clark and Stewart, being
somewhat conservative in their approach, are more willing to tip the scales in the
direction of the rights of the state.
This liberal-conservative split is exemplified in some of the recent cases in-
volving matters of internal security. These cases, coming largely as a result of the
hardening of American-Russian relations, reflect our nation's intense concern with
the problems of Communist subversion and internal security. But what the future
has in store, or what test the Court will apply in the future, is not capable of de-
termination. It does seem fair to say, however, that the future actions of the Court
will depend in large measure upon public opinion, international relations, personal
philosophy and many other such variables.
JAmEs D. SICKAL
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